13D weekly report - January 12, 2025 to January 16, 2026

Gottwald urges Tredegar Corp (TG) to sell assets and go private

Key Summary: On January 14, 2026, John D. Gottwald urged Tredegar’s board to sell its two remaining businesses and exit the public markets, citing high holding-company costs, lack of synergies, long-term underperformance, a 59% share price decline, and the dividend cut, and warned he will vote against the board absent decisive action.

M. Cap: $282mm | Tredegar Corporation is engaged, through its subsidiaries, in the manufacture of polyethylene (PE) plastic films, polyester (PET) films and aluminum extrusions. 

John D. Gottwald

On January 14, 2026, John D. Gottwald issued an open letter to the Board arguing that despite confidence in new CEO Bapi DasGupta, the best outcome for shareholders is to sell Tredegar’s two unrelated businesses—Bonnell and Surface Protection Films—and exit the public markets, citing a costly holding-company structure with no synergies, rising overhead, and severe long-term underperformance versus the S&P 500, including a 59% share price decline and dividend elimination, and warns he will continue voting against the board absent decisive action to unlock value.

GAMCO Investors

Gamco pressed for governance changes in 2013 by proposing the removal of the poison pill, which the company eliminated in February 2014, later increased its stake to 17.42% by September 2015, and subsequently reduced its ownership to 11.64% by June 2020.

Maran Capital reached an agreement with Pure Cycle Corporation (PCYO)

Key Summary: On January 14, 2026, Maran Capital reached an agreement under which the board will appoint its nominee Daniel J. Roller as a director after the 2026 annual meeting and name him chair of a newly formed Strategy and Capital Allocation Committee, with a term through the 2027 annual meeting.

M. Cap: $280mm | Pure Cycle Corporation provides water and wastewater services in the United States. 

On January 14, 2026, Maran Capital entered into an agreement with the company under which the board will appoint Maran nominee Daniel J. Roller as a director effective one business day after the 2026 annual meeting, with a term running to the 2027 annual meeting, and form a Strategy and Capital Allocation Committee chaired by Roller; the agreement grants Maran replacement rights for Roller or Daniel Kozlowski if Maran maintains at least 12.2% ownership, while Maran agreed to vote with the board’s slate and recommendations during the standstill period, subject to limited carve-outs and proxy advisor exceptions, and to customary standstill restrictions including limits on activism, proxy contests, proposals, board representation, and ownership increases above 17.2% until the standstill expires or an extraordinary transaction is announced.

Broadwood Partners entered into a cooperation agreement with STAAR Surgical’s (STAA)

Key Summary: From early 2024 to late 2025, Broadwood Partners steadily increased its stake in STAAR Surgical to over 25%, repeatedly voicing confidence in management and governance improvements while opposing any sale below long-term value. Following Alcon’s $28-per-share acquisition proposal, Broadwood and Yunqi Capital (5.1%) led a vigorous campaign against the deal, citing a flawed process, undervaluation, ignored competing interest, and conflicts of interest. Supported by major proxy advisors, they urged shareholders to reject the merger, demanded transparency, and called for governance reforms, with Yunqi later proposing board representation to realign the company’s direction. At the Special Meeting held on January 6, 2026, the merger proposal was not approved by the shareholders. On January 14, 2026, Broadwood Partners entered into a cooperation agreement under which the board accepted the resignations of Stephen C. Farrell and Elizabeth Yeu, expanded from six to seven directors, and appointed Neal C. Bradsher, Richard T. LeBuhn, and Christopher Min Fang Wang, all to be nominated at the 2026 annual meeting.                                                                                  

Market Cap: $1.3 billion | STAAR Surgical Company designs, develops, manufactures and sells implantable lenses for the eye and delivery systems used to deliver the lenses into the eye.

On January 10, 2024, Broadwood Partners (22.1%) stated that despite the company's stock price having fallen since its last filing in November 2023, it believed the company had continued to grow and improve its financials. It opposed any acquisition offer at a price below its perceived long-term value. Broadwood Partners also emphasized the importance of corporate governance and shareholder alignment, noting past contributions and recent improvements. It planned to remain engaged in dialogue with the Board and other shareholders for further governance enhancements and value creation. Source

On March 3, 2025, Broadwood Partners raised its stake to 24.2% and expressed support for the new CEO, expecting improved profitability and growth, while also engaging with the Board on governance and strategic issues to foster long-term shareholder value. Source

On April 2, 2025, Broadwood Partners raised its stake to 25.4% and support the new CEO and Interim CFO, citing their track records, and welcome recent governance improvements, including the separation of CEO and Chair roles and the addition of Asia-focused directors.

On August 5, 2025, the company agreed to be acquired by Alcon, but Broadwood Partners remains undecided, seeking records on the merger process and exploring alternative partners or strategies to enhance shareholder value. Source

On August 5, 2025, the company announced that it had entered into a definitive merger agreement through which Alcon will acquire the company. On September 2, 2025, Broadwood Partners announced it will vote against Alcon’s proposed acquisition, citing serious process and valuation flaws. Broadwood argued the deal undervalues STAAR, noting Alcon’s earlier, higher $55 + $7 CVR offer, the lack of a proper market check, and that STAAR’s improving fundamentals and cost discipline were ignored when the deal was struck. Source

On September 15, 2025, Broadwood Partners filed proxy materials urging stockholders to vote against the proposed merger with Alcon Research, arguing it is not in shareholders’ best interests. Source

On September 22, 2025, Yunqi Capital (5.1%) announced it will vote against the company’s proposed $28 per share sale to Alcon, arguing the deal materially undervalues STAAR and results from a flawed process. In an open letter, Yunqi criticized the Board for engaging only with Alcon, limiting competing bids, and adopting an overly pessimistic view of China—STAAR’s key market—despite signs of recovery. While open to a transaction at a fair price, Yunqi urged shareholders to reject the current terms, stressing STAAR’s strong standalone prospects in the global refractive surgery market.

On September 24, 2025, the Broadwood Partners filed a definitive proxy statement and GREEN proxy card with the SEC urging shareholders to vote AGAINST the proposed merger and related compensation proposal at the upcoming special meeting. They also issued a press release and letter to stockholders announcing their campaign website, www.LetSTAARShine.com, arguing the merger is suboptimal due to poor timing, a flawed process, and conflicts of interest within the board and management. Source

On October 2, 2025, Broadwood Partners issued an investor presentation titled “The Wrong Time, Wrong Process and Wrong Price”.

On October 6, 2025, Broadwood Partners issued a letter to the shareholders urging them to vote “AGAINST” the $28-per-share sale to Alcon, calling it unjustified after the board rejected Alcon’s $58 offer last year.

On October 7, 2025, Yunqi Capital strongly opposes the proposed merger with Alcon, arguing that STAAR significantly underestimates its business strength, especially in China, and misrepresents its performance and market position. Source

On October 9, 2025, Glass Lewis & Co. recommended that shareholders vote against the proposed $28-per-share sale of STAAR to Alcon AG. Source

On October 14, 2025, Broadwood Partners criticized STAAR’s delayed disclosure that another strategic buyer had expressed acquisition interest in April 2025—information allegedly withheld from the full board when it approved the sale to Alcon. Broadwood called this a serious breach of transparency and governance, noting STAAR’s CEO and Board Chair ignored the outreach from a major private equity–backed suitor and only acknowledged it in a recent SEC filing. Broadwood urged shareholders to vote against the proposed Alcon acquisition, citing a flawed sale process and lack of disclosure. Source

On October 15, 2025, Broadwood Partners announced that all three major proxy advisory firms—ISS, Glass Lewis, and Egan-Jones—have recommended STAAR Surgical shareholders vote against the proposed sale to Alcon

On October 17, 2025, Broadwood Partners sent a letter to STAAR’s board urging it to proceed with the October 23, 2025 shareholder vote on the proposed sale to Alcon without delay or manipulation. Broadwood criticized the sale process as flawed and the deal price as inadequate, noting that major investors and proxy advisors also oppose it.

On October 21, 2025 Yunqi Capital issued via press release an open letter to the board of directors further discussing its continued intention to vote against the Proposed Merger.

On October 21, 2025, Broadwood Partners informed the Board of their intent to call a separate special meeting to remove several directors (yet to be identified) and warned the Board not to take any action regarding the proposed merger before the October 23, 2025 stockholder vote. Source

On October 25, 2025, Yunqi Capital via press release an open letter to the board opposing the Board’s decision to delay the shareholder vote on the $28-per-share sale to Alcon, calling it unnecessary and harmful. It warned against a new “go-shop” or rushed sale, citing conflicts of interest and the deterrent effect of Alcon’s low offer. Yunqi urged the Board to end the Alcon deal and later pursue a proper strategic review from a stronger position, noting rising ICL demand in China and urging disclosure of in-market sales data to reflect STAAR’s improving fundamentals.

On October 27, 2025, STAAR Surgical postponed its special meeting to vote on the merger with Alcon from November 6 to December 3, 2025. Source

On October 31, 2025, Yunqi Capital issued a press release urging the board to terminate the proposed merger, criticizing the adjournment and postponement of the special meeting, and highlighting stockholder opposition already reflected in the vote. They also suggested adding stockholder representation to the board, proposing Yunqi Capital’s CIO, Christopher M. Wang, as a potential director.

On November 4, 2025, Alcon released investor materials supporting its proposed acquisition of STAAR Surgical, emphasizing that the offer provides a premium well above comparable MedTech deals and delivers certain value to shareholders. The company criticized Broadwood Partners’ opposition campaign as a “silent takeover” aimed at seizing control of STAAR without offering stockholders any premium or alternative transaction. Alcon reiterated its request for STAAR’s board to accept an amended merger agreement that includes an unencumbered go-shop period, asserting this would confirm that Alcon’s proposal offers the best outcome for shareholders. Source

On November 4, 2025, Broadwood Partners denounced Alcon’s investor presentation as misleading and self-serving, accusing both Alcon and STAAR’s board of spreading false claims to justify an undervalued takeover. Broadwood argued that STAAR’s board has no obligation to seek Alcon’s consent to remain independent or explore alternatives and urged shareholders to vote “AGAINST” the merger. The firm criticized the board for delaying the vote despite widespread shareholder and proxy advisor opposition and asserted that, once the deal is rejected, STAAR can freely pursue a proper strategic process. Source

On November 6, 2025, Broadwood Partners, L.P. and its affiliates updated their website, www.LetSTAARShine.com, to include a press release issued by Yunqi Capital Limited on the same date. Yunqi Capital applauded strong Q3 results and renewed its call to terminate the $28-per-share sale to Alcon, saying the offer undervalues the company. It argued China’s issues are temporary, accused Alcon of selective data use, and noted 72% of shares reportedly opposed the merger.

On December 2, 2025, Broadwood Partners stated that it is moving to call a special shareholder meeting to remove three directors—Chair Elizabeth Yeu, CEO Stephen Farrell, and Compensation Chair Arthur Butcher—arguing they oversaw a flawed, conflicted sale process that pushed an undervalued deal with Alcon while ignoring alternative interest. Broadwood claims undisclosed relationships, excessive golden parachutes, and misaligned incentives eroded trust, and says board refreshment is needed to restore credibility and ensure any strategic alternatives process is independent, fair, and aimed at maximizing value. Source

On December 8, 2025, Broadwood Partners announced that proxy advisor Egan-Jones has reaffirmed its recommendation that STAAR Surgical shareholders vote against the proposed sale to Alcon, criticizing the rushed 30-day go-shop as superficial and saying the valuation, process integrity, and board objectivity remain unacceptable.

On December 9, 2025, Alcon raised its offer for STAAR to $30.75 per share after a failed go-shop, adding $150 million in value and cutting executive payouts, while urging shareholders to approve the now $1.6 billion deal. Broadwood, with 30.2% ownership, opposes the transaction, arguing the sale process was conflicted, undervalued the company, and ignored prior higher offers. It maintains STAAR is worth more as an independent business and urges shareholders to vote against the deal. Source

On December 11, 2025, Yunqi Capital urges shareholders to reject the revised $30.75-per-share Alcon deal, arguing STAAR is rebounding and not ready for sale, and that the board ran a flawed, restrictive go-shop designed to lock in Alcon rather than seek real alternatives. Source

On December 11, 2025, Broadwood Partners issued an investor presentation titled “Still the Wrong Time, Wrong Process and Wrong Price,”

On December 12, 2025, Broadwood Partners said Glass Lewis reaffirmed its recommendation that STAAR Surgical shareholders vote AGAINST the proposed sale to Alcon, arguing the revised offer is not compelling and the board lacks credibility. Source

On December 19, 2025, Broadwood Partners criticized the Board for postponing for a fourth time the shareholder vote on STAAR’s proposed sale to Alcon Inc., pushing the meeting from October 23, 2025 to January 6, 2026. Broadwood argued the delays reflect weak shareholder support, called the transaction ill-conceived on price and timing, cited opposition from major shareholders, proxy advisors, and a company director, and urged the Board to allow a final vote and shareholders to reject the deal. Source

At the Special Meeting held on January 6, 2026, the merger proposal was not approved by the shareholders.

On January 14, 2026, Broadwood Partners entered into a cooperation agreement with the company under which the board accepted the resignations of Stephen C. Farrell and Elizabeth Yeu, expanded the board from six to seven directors, and appointed Neal C. Bradsher (Founder and President of Broadwood Capital), Richard T. LeBuhn (Executive Vice President at Broadwood Capital), and Christopher Min Fang Wang (founder and CIO of Yunqi Capital), all of whom will also be nominated for election at the 2026 annual meeting; Farrell is expected to remain CEO until January 31, 2026 or earlier if determined by the board, Broadwood agreed not to seek a special shareholder meeting until June 18, 2026, the parties exchanged mutual releases and non-disparagement provisions, the company agreed to reimburse Broadwood, Yunqi Capital, and Defender Capital for expenses related to the merger special meeting, and Bradsher and LeBuhn were appointed to serve immediately until the 2026 annual meeting.

Past

In 2015, Broadwood Partners disclosed a 2.3% stake and sought a board seat, while it increased its holdings from 17.3% to 21.6%, citing governance and alignment concerns and faith in management. In 2016, Broadwood's stake grew to 27%, recognizing governance improvements but maintaining alignment concerns, emphasizing the need for more progress. In August 2018, holding 24.7%, Broadwood Partners noted substantial company progress under improved management, better results, and increased recognition, acknowledging governance advancements and committing to ongoing dialogue for long-term value. In August 2020, with a 23.6% stake, it reaffirmed its belief in the company's progress, and on January 28, 2021, at 21.5%, expressed satisfaction with ongoing corporate governance enhancements, crediting shareholder-oriented governance since 2014-2016 via shareholder-board dialogue.

Engaged Capital Announces Intention to Nominate Director Candidates to BlackLine, Inc.’s (BL) Board

Key Summary: On November 25, 2025, Engaged Capital demanded BlackLine’s books and records to review the company’s handling of takeover offers, including a rejected ~$66/share bid from SAP, and said the results will determine whether it runs a director slate for the 2026 AGM. On January 13, 2026, Engaged Capital announced its intention to nominate a slate of independent director candidates to BlackLine’s Board at the 2026 annual meeting

Market Cap: $3.6 billion | BlackLine, Inc. provides cloud-based solutions to automate and streamline accounting and finance operations in the United States and internationally.

On November 25, 2025, Engaged Capital, which owns 1.2 million BlackLine shares, has demanded books and records to investigate how the company handled multiple takeover approaches, including a rejected ~$66/share offer from SAP. Engaged says the findings will determine whether it will run a director slate for BlackLine’s 2026 annual meeting. The request follows Engaged’s recent push for a sale and comes amid broader pressure from other investors—including Ananym, Tensile, and Sheffield—urging BlackLine to explore strategic options.

On January 13, 2026, Engaged Capital announced its intention to nominate a slate of independent director candidates to BlackLine’s Board at the 2026 annual meeting, citing prolonged stock underperformance, decelerating growth, valuation compression, and what it views as the Board’s failure to act in shareholders’ best interests, including the reported rejection of a premium acquisition offer and apparent entrenchment efforts through a proposed board size reduction. Engaged argues that reconstituting the Board is necessary to ensure objective evaluation of strategic alternatives, including a potential sale.

Stilwell Seeks Collaboration with Catalyst Bancorp, Inc (CLST) to Boost Shareholder Value

Key Summary: On October 30, 2025, Joseph Stilwell (5.2%) expressed interest in collaborating with management and the Board to enhance shareholder value. On January 12, 2026, Joseph Stilwell increased his stake to 6.3%

Market Cap: $56 million | Catalyst Bancorp, Inc. operates as a holding company for Catalyst Bank that provides various banking products and services to individuals and businesses in Louisiana.

On October 30, 2025, Joseph Stilwell (5.2%) stated that he hopes to work with management and Board to maximize shareholder value. Source

On January 12, 2026, Joseph Stilwell increased his stake to 6.3% and stated that he hopes to work with management and Board to maximize shareholder value. Source

Altai Capital nominated Board candidates to OraSure Technologies (OSUR)

Key Summary: On September 9, 2025, Altai Capital Management (5.13%) said it may engage with management, the board, shareholders, and other stakeholders on strategy, governance, capital structure, and board composition to enhance shareholder value. On December 17, 2025, Altai Capital Management announced its intent to nominate Rishi Bajaj and Digital Diagnostics CEO John Bertrand to the board at the 2026 AGM

Market Cap: $245 million | OraSure Technologies, Inc develops, manufactures, markets, sells, and distributes diagnostic products, specimen collection devices, and other diagnostic products in the United States, Europe, Africa, and internationally. 

·         On September 9, 2025, Altai Capital Management (5.13%) stated that it has engaged, and may continue to engage, with the management, board, shareholders, and other stakeholders on matters such as strategy, governance, capital structure, and board composition, with the goal of enhancing shareholder value. Source

·         On December 17, 2025, Altai Capital Management announced its intent to nominate Rishi Bajaj and Digital Diagnostics CEO John Bertrand to the board at the 2026 AGM, citing deep dissatisfaction with the board’s strategy, capital allocation, and governance. Altai argues OraSure squandered its Covid windfall, made poor venture-style investments, continues to burn cash, and has massively underperformed peers, while recent board refreshment efforts are merely cosmetic. Source

·         On January 15, 2026, Altai Capital Management nominated Mr. Bajaj and John Bertrand for election to the Board and submitted a proposal to declassify the Board so that all directors stand for annual election at the 2026 Annual Meeting, and stated that it plans to solicit proxies to elect its nominees and approve the declassification proposal. Source

GAMCO raises governance and financing concerns at Lee Enterprises (LEE)

Key Summary:

GAMCO Investors: On January 14, 2026, GAMCO sent a letter to shareholders outlining concerns on a proposed private placement, related financing, and governance, stating no negotiations or agreements exist with the company.

Alden Global Capital–led group: From late 2021 to early 2022, Alden and affiliates pursued a $24 per share non-binding acquisition proposal, launched an aggressive proxy and “vote no” campaign challenging long-tenured directors and governance practices, but ultimately lost at the 2022 AGM after court rulings and shareholder votes favored the company’s slate.

Other shareholders (Cannell, Praetorian): Cannell Capital repeatedly criticized board governance and valuation, adjusted its stake, and argued for major upside under new stewardship, while Praetorian Capital opposed Alden’s bid as opportunistic and materially undervaluing Lee, highlighting rapid digital growth and a potential valuation well above $100 per share.

Market Cap: $31 million | Lee Enterprises, Incorporated (LEE) provides local news and information, and advertising services in the United States.

GAMCO Investors

On January 14, 2026, GAMCO Investors sent a letter to the shareholders outlining their views on recent developments, including the proposed private placement, related financing transactions, and governance issues, and confirmed that no negotiations or agreements are in place with the company. Source

Alden Global Capital, LLC, Strategic Investment Opportunities LLC and MNG Enterprises

·         On November 22, 2021, Alden Global Capital, LLC, together with MNG Enterprises and Strategic Investment Opportunities LLC (together 6.3%) delivered a Non-Binding Proposal to the board in respect of a potential offer by Alden to acquire all of the outstanding shares of common stock at a price per share equal to $24.00 in cash. Source

·         On November 29, 2021, the shareholder group announced that they delivered a notice of nomination of three individuals to serve on the board. Source

·         On December 9, 2021, the company issued a press release announcing that the board rejected the Alden Proposal. 

·         On December 15, 2021, MNG Enterprises filed a complaint with respect to the company's rejection of its previously reported director nominees. Source

·         On January 27, 2022, the shareholder group delivered a letter to the company withdrawing the nomination of Carlos Salas, one of its original Board candidates, in light of the decision to focus its proxy contest efforts on the replacement of two of the company's director nominees, Ms. Junck and Mr. Moloney, both of whom are extremely long-tenured and have been re-nominated in apparent contravention of the company's director retirement policy.

·         On January 28, 2022, MNG Enterprises delivered to the company a letter requesting to inspect a complete list of the company's stockholders and certain other corporate records as permitted by applicable state law (the "Stockholder List Demand Letter"). The purpose of the Stockholder List Demand Letter is to enable MNG Enterprises to communicate with the stockholders in connection with its solicitation and any other matters that may properly come before the annual meeting. Source

·         On February 3, 2022, the shareholder group issued a statement regarding the company. Kindly click here to read the statement.

·         On February 8, 2022, the shareholder group filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees. Source

·         On February 15, 2022, the company announced that the Delaware Chancery Court has upheld the decision by Lee's Board of Directors to reject the director nomination notice submitted by Alden Global Capital, LLC

·         On February 15, 2022, Alden Global Capital issued a statement in response to the Delaware Chancery Court's decision to uphold Lee's invalidation of Alden's two highly qualified and fully independent director candidates and announced that its affiliate would be filing preliminary proxy materials with the SEC for a "Vote No" campaign seeking shareholder support to compel the resignations of two extremely long-tenured and deeply entrenched incumbent candidates – Mary Junck and Herbert Moloney III – and to send a clear message that meaningful governance improvements and Board enhancements are required at Lee to turn around years of poor performance. Also, the shareholder group issued a presentation entitled "Independent and Experienced Leadership is Required to Create Stockholder Value at Lee Enterprises – VOTE AGAINST the election of Mary Junck and Herb Moloney"

·         On February 16, 2022, the shareholder group sent a letter to the board discussing their concerns with the current plurality voting standard for the election of directors at the Annual Meeting and their views that the board was clearly using the plurality voting standard as a tool to entrench themselves further and avoid accountability to the stockholders.

·         On February 22, 2022, the shareholder group filed proxy materials seeking support to vote WITHHOLD on the re-election of Mary E. Junck and Herbert W. Moloney III as directors whom they believe are most responsible for the Company’s history of poor performance and poor governance.  Also, a member of the Stockholder Group, Strategic Investment Opportunities LLC filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware with respect to the company's determination that the election of directors at the Annual Meeting is “contested” and that a plurality voting standard applies. Source

·         On March 2, 2022,  Communications Workers of America urges shareholders to vote FOR the three director nominees put forward by the Lee Enterprises' Board on the WHITE proxy card and to REJECT Alden Global Capital’s “vote no” campaign on the BLUE proxy card. Source

·         On March 10, 2022, the company announced that at the AGM, shareholders overwhelmingly voted to re-elect Lee’s three director nominees.

Cannell Capital

·         In 2019, Cannell Capital recommended shareholders to vote AGAINST the election of incumbent directors. At the AGM held on February 20, 2019, all the incumbent directors were re-elected to the board.

·         On February 19, 2021, Cannell Capital (8.64%) stated that it had enjoyed a telephone call with Lee Enterprises Chairman Mary E. Junck in which it proposed and requested a reply to a recommendation for the addition of a new member to the board of directors. Cannell Capital believes that the company is undervalued and that this new member of the board's appointment would go a long way toward decreasing the discount between LEE's market value and its estimate of LEE's economic value. On February 26, 2021, Ms. Junck replied to Cannell Capital, dismissing its recommendation and request. While Cannell Capital applauds the progress that the company has made, it believes that there is considerably more work to be done and that changes to the board of directors would benefit all shareholders. Source

·         On August 31, 2021, Cannell Capital (6.84%) sent a letter to the Chairwoman of the Board calling upon all owners to infuse the Lee board with more forward-thinking people to accomplish its mission and increase value for all shareholders. In its letter, Cannell Capital included two attachments: its thesis, which values Lee's current shares at $205 per share assuming (a very important assumption) new stewardship, and a list of questions for Lee. Cannell reiterates the morality and benevolent intent of Lee's management and the BOD. To read more, click here.

·         On September 23, 2021, Cannell Capital increased its stake to 8.21%.

·         On January 26, 2022, Cannell Capital decreased its stake to 7.24%.

·         On April 11, 2022, Cannell Capital increased its stake to 9.3% and disclose the list of questions regarding corporate governance structures.

Praetorian Capital Management 

On December 8, 2021, Mr. Kupperman, Praetorian Capital Management (7.31%), submitted a letter to the board regarding the takeover proposal by Alden Global Capital, LLC issued on November 22, 2021. He stated that Alden's proposed purchase price is insufficient and opportunistic, grossly undervaluing the business.

Valuation insight

I believe the shares are worth north of $100 today and likely worth a few hundred each if the digital transformation continues at the current pace. The only reason that the shares trade where they do, is that investors have yet to realize that while the traditional print newspaper business slowly declines, the digital business has been growing rapidly, becoming an increasingly substantial percentage of the total business. Based on third quarter, 2021 numbers, LEE's digital business grew revenue by 48.3% over the prior year, with digital subscriber count growing by 50.5%. A full 33.4% of the company's revenue and almost half of the company's adjusted EBITDA now comes from this rapidly growing digital business. I believe that by 2023, approximately half of revenue and two-thirds of adjusted EBITDA will come from the digital business.

LEE has produced Trailing Twelve Month (TTM) Adjusted EBITDA of $116.2 million and this is despite the effects of COVID on the local marketing business and before the full synergies of the B.H. Media merger could be realized. I believe the company can earn north of $150 million of Adjusted EBITDA in 2023 and if LEE traded at 15 times Enterprise Value (E.V.) to Adjusted EBITDA (adjusted for debt paydown), it would still trade at a discount to more dominant papers like the New York Times (NYT) at approximately 20 times EV/EBITDA, yet trade for north of $300 per share.

Biglari Holdings withdrew their nomination of both nominees but keeps pressure on board composition at Jack in the Box Inc (JACK)

Key Summary:

Biglari Holdings: Biglari Holdings escalated engagement after a July 2025 poison pill, nominating directors, filing proxy materials for the 2026 AGM, criticizing long-term value destruction, and opposing Say-on-Pay, incentive plan changes, and the rights agreement. By January 2026, Biglari withdrew both Sardar Biglari and Douglas Thompson as nominees (the latter due to his CAVA COO role), while continuing board-level discussions and leaving open a potential withhold campaign.

GreenWood Investors: Signed cooperation agreement on Nov 3, 2025 adding two GreenWood-backed directors with standstill and voting terms; Alan Smolinisky joined the board on Nov 7, 2025.

Jana Partners: Disclosed 7.3% in Feb 2018 and engaged on capital structure and strategy; entered confidentiality/standstill and cooperation agreements to add two directors, later amended through early 2019; stake reduced to 3.4% and two Jana-recommended directors were appointed in May 2019.

M.Cap: $444 million | Jack in the Box Inc. operates and franchises Jack in the Box quick-service restaurants (QSRs) and Qdoba Mexican Eats (Qdoba) fast-casual restaurants.

Biglari Holdings

·         On July 10, 2025, Biglari Holdings filed a Schedule 13D following the Board’s adoption of a poison pill, stating they may engage with management on potential changes to operations, governance, or capital structure, and may also communicate with other shareholders or third parties under confidentiality agreements. Source

·         On October 31, 2025, Biglari Holdings delivered a letter to the company nominating Sardar Biglari and Douglas Thompson for election to the Board at the 2026 annual meeting of shareholders. Source

·         On December 23, 2025, Biglari Holdings filed proxy materials soliciting proxies for the 2026 annual meeting to elect its nominee, Douglas Thompson, to the board alongside nine company nominees it does not oppose, arguing the current board has overseen years of shareholder value destruction and needs stronger oversight. Biglari urges shareholders to vote using its GOLD universal proxy card “FOR” its nominee and the nine company nominees, and “AGAINST” Say-on-Pay, the incentive plan amendment, and the rights agreement. Source

·         On December 23, 2025, Biglari Holdings withdrew their nomination of Sardar Biglari as a nominee at the Annual Meeting. Source

·         On January 14, 2026, Biglari Holdings withdrew their nomination of Douglas Thompson as a nominee at the Annual Meeting following his appointment as COO of CAVA, will continue discussions with the company on board composition including proposing an alternate qualified candidate, and may pursue a withhold campaign against one or more directors depending on the outcome. Source

GreenWood Investors

On November 3, 2025, the company signed a cooperation agreement with GreenWood that added two GreenWood-backed directors, imposed standstill and voting commitments, set ownership thresholds tied to board rights, and included plans for a confidentiality agreement. Source

Effective November 7, 2025, the company appointed Alan Smolinisky to its board as a representative of GreenWood Investors, LLC

Jana Partners

·         On February 15, 2018, Jana Partners disclosed 7.3% and stated that it had discussions with the company regarding the capital structure, margins, capital allocation, franchise mix, and operations. It stated that it may have further discussions with the company regarding these and other topics including governance and Board composition. Source

·         On October 25, 2018, Jana Partners (6.7%) entered into a confidentiality and standstill letter agreement with the company. Under the Confidentiality Agreement, Jana Partners agreed to maintain the confidentiality of certain business information to be furnished by the company to Jana Partners and to abide by customary standstill obligations, subject to certain exceptions. Source

·         On October 29, 2018, the company and Jana Partners entered into a Cooperation Agreement. Pursuant to it, the company and Jana Partners will cooperate in good faith to agree upon two individuals recommended by Jana Partners (each a “New Independent Director”) to be added to the Board of Directors. Source

·         On January 4, 2019, the company and Jana Partners (6%) entered into an amendment to the Cooperation Agreement pursuant to which the deadline to appoint the new independent directors was extended to March 15, 2019. Source

·         On January 14, 2019, Jana Partners reduced its stake to 3.4%.

·         On April 25, 2019, the Company and Jana Partners entered into Amendment No. 3 to the Cooperation Agreement between the Company and Jana Partners dated October 29, 2018. Pursuant to which the Company added two individuals to the board on May 27, 2019. Source