13D weekly report - November 10, 2025 to November 14, 2025

Engine Capital nominated two candidates to the Board of UniFirst Corporation (UNF)

Key Summary: On November 14, 2025, Engine Capital nominated two candidates to the Board.

Market Cap: $2.8 billion | UniFirst Corporation provides workplace uniforms and protective work wear clothing in the United States, Europe, and Canada.

On November 14, 2025, Engine Capital (3.1%) filed proxy materials nominating two candidates to the Board at the upcoming AGM. It argued that the Board needs directors with stronger M&A and capital-allocation expertise to enhance shareholder value. Source

Galloway Capital Pushes for Strategic Review and Stronger Investor Communication at T Stamp Inc (IDAI)

Key Summary: On November 13, 2025, Galloway Capital Partners (7.56%) urged the company to hire a financial advisor to explore strategic options and strengthen investor communication, citing the recent capital raise and strong IP portfolio.

Market Cap: $24 million | T Stamp Inc., together with its subsidiaries, develops and markets identity authentication software solutions for government and enterprise partners, and peer-to-peer markets worldwide. 

On November 13, 2025, Galloway Capital Partners (7.56%) urges the company to hire a financial advisor to review strategic options and improve its communication with investors, arguing that the recent capital raise and strong IP portfolio justify a stronger Wall Street profile. Source

Carl C. Icahn reached a nomination agreement with Centuri Holdings, Inc (CTRI)

Key Summary: On November 10, 2025, Carl C. Icahn (14.4%) reached a nomination agreement with the company

Market Cap: $1.8 billion | Centuri Holdings, Inc. operates as a utility infrastructure services company in North America. 

On November 10, 2025, Carl C. Icahn (14.4%) reached a nomination agreement under which Dustin DeMaria joined the board and will be included on the 2026 director slate, while the investors agreed to certain standstill terms. Source

Lynx1 Capital nominates directors and proposes $5.20 per share takeover for Neuphoria Therapeutics Inc (NEUP)

Key Summary: On November 9, 2025, Lynx1 Capital Management (26.5%) nominated two directors, Kimberly Smith and Stephen Doberstein, and on November 10 proposed acquiring the company for $5.20 per share in cash, a 27% premium, through its affiliated funds.

Market Cap: $12 million | Neuphoria Therapeutics Inc., a clinical stage biopharmaceutical company, discovers and develops novel allosteric ion channel modulators for the treatment of central nervous system disorders in Australia. 

·         On November 9, 2025, Lynx1 Capital Management (26.5%) nominated two independent candidates, Kimberly Smith and Stephen Doberstein, for election to the company’s board at the December 9, 2025 annual meeting. The next day, they submitted a non-binding proposal to acquire all outstanding shares for $5.20 per share in cash — a 27% premium to the prior closing price — through affiliated investment funds. Source

·         On November 14, 2025, Lynx1 Capital Management filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees.

BML Capital condemns Adverum Biotechnologies, Inc (ADVM) merger with Eli Lilly as flawed and value-destructive

Key Summary: On November 10, 2025, BML Capital Management (15.5%) criticized Adverum’s merger with Eli Lilly as flawed and value-destructive, accusing the board of breaching its fiduciary duty by failing to initiate a timely sale after Party A’s June 2025 withdrawal.

Market Cap: $94 million | Adverum Biotechnologies, Inc., a clinical-stage gene therapy company, engages in developing gene therapy product candidates to treat ocular and rare diseases.

BML Capital Management

On November 10, 2025, BML Capital Management (15.5%) sent a letter to Adverum Biotechnologies’ board criticizing the merger with Eli Lilly as deeply flawed and value-destructive. BML accused the board of mishandling the process by failing to launch a sale immediately after Party A withdrew in June 2025, despite Adverum’s limited cash runway, calling it a breach of fiduciary duty.

Sonic Fund

Sonic Fund, a 6% shareholder, entered a cooperation agreement with the company in May 2019, leading to the appointment of three mutually agreed board members. After reducing its stake to 4.4% in August 2020, Sonic reignited activism in March 2021 with a letter criticizing management and announcing plans to nominate five directors. It launched a full proxy campaign, including multiple filings, presentations, and a dedicated website. Proxy advisors ISS and Glass Lewis both backed Sonic’s three nominees, but at the May 12, 2021 AGM, shareholders ultimately elected the company’s nominees instead.

DOMA Perpetual Capital Management urges Pacira BioSciences, Inc. (PCRX) to pursue sale amid ongoing underperformance

Key Summary: On March 14, 2025, DOMA Perpetual Capital Management announced the nomination of three director candidates, expressing concerns over the company's 76% decline in stock performance over the past decade and misaligned management compensation. On April 21, 2025, DOMA withdrew its nomination. On November 10, 2025, DOMA Perpetual Capital Management (6.83%) urged Pacira’s board to hire bankers and pursue a sale, citing excessive compensation, rising costs, and poor returns.

Market Cap: $993 million | Pacira BioSciences, Inc. engages in the development, manufacture, marketing, distribution, and sale of non-opioid pain management and regenerative health solutions to healthcare practitioners in the United States. 

·         On December 11, 2024, DOMA Perpetual Capital Management (4.14%) announced its intent to nominate four independent director candidates at the 2025 annual meeting. DOMA expressed confidence in Pacira’s intellectual property and criticized the stock as significantly undervalued. It urged the company to initiate a tender offer for 10 million shares using cash on hand and execute its approved $150 million buyback program supported by strong free cash flow. Source

·         On March 14, 2025, DOMA Perpetual Capital Management announced the nomination of three director candidates citing concerns over company's poor stock performance (down 76% in the last decade) and misaligned management compensation. Source

·         On April 21, 2025, DOMA withdrew its nomination.

·         On November 10, 2025, DOMA Perpetual Capital Management (6.83%) sent a public letter to the Board recommending actions, including engaging a banker to explore a sale of the business. They criticized excessive stock-based compensation, rising costs, and management’s failure to deliver returns, despite repeated shareholder communications. DOMA argues that Pacira’s flagship product, Exparel, remains undervalued and could achieve a valuation near $66 per share under a strategic buyer. The letter calls for hiring bankers to run a sale process by Q1 2026, freezing new M&A and R&D projects, cutting costs, and completing the current $300 million buyback before launching another.

Proxy Advisory Firms, ISS, Glass Lewis, and Egan-Jones, Conclude Change is Warranted at Cracker Barrel (CBRL) and Recommend Vote AGAINST Cracker Barrel Nominees

Key Summary:  On September 18, 2025, Biglari Capital (2.9%) urged shareholders to vote WITHHOLD on CEO/director Julie Masino and director/Compensation Chair Gilbert Dávila at the November 20 meeting, citing value destruction, brand missteps, failed marketing, excessive pay, and the Board’s misuse of capital to block dissent.

Market Cap: $707 million| Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. develops and operates the Cracker Barrel Old Country Store concept in the United States.

·         On September 18, 2025, Biglari Capital (2.9%) urges shareholders to vote WITHHOLD on the re-election of CEO/director Julie Masino and director/Compensation Chair Gilbert Dávila at the November 20, 2025 annual meeting. Biglari Capital argues that under Masino’s leadership the Company has suffered value destruction, brand missteps, and alienated customers, while Dávila bears responsibility for failed marketing strategies and excessive executive pay. They criticize the Board for wasting shareholder capital, resisting accountability, and spending heavily to block dissenting voices. Source

·         On October 7, 2025, Biglari Capital criticized the board for repeated strategic missteps over 14 years, including failed new concepts (Holler & Dash, Punch Bowl Social), an underperforming acquisition (Maple Street Biscuit), and a $700 million remodel plan opposed by the group, which they argue ignored core customer needs and ultimately backfired following significant public backlash and declining traffic. The letter argues that both current CEO Julie Felss Masino and board member Gilbert Dávila have overseen a sharp drop in shareholder value and urges shareholders to vote “AGAINST” their re-election to restore brand authenticity, accountability, and lost credibility, echoing similar calls from major institutional shareholders and a company founder.

·         On October 24, 2025, Biglari issued an Investor Presentation arguing that the company’s $700 million Transformation Plan, led by CEO Julie Masino, has resulted in a catastrophic loss of shareholder value—over $1.2 billion since her appointment in August 2023—and severe damage to the brand and customer relationships due to failed rebranding and remodeling efforts, which triggered unprecedented consumer uproar and financial underperformance. The presentation highlights shareholder rights restrictions via new bylaws, persistent guest traffic declines, withdrawal of financial guidance, widespread analyst skepticism, and calls for leadership change, asserting that both CEO Masino and Board member Gilbert Dávila should be held accountable for the company’s mismanagement and lack of a credible turnaround strategy.

·         On October 31, 2025, Biglari issued a rebuttal Investor Presentation arguing that the company’s “Transformation Plan” is failing—highlighting deteriorating guest traffic, declining guidance for FY 2026, mis-allocated capital expenditures, inadequate leadership from CEO Julie Masino and Board member Gilbert Dávila, and governance measures that limit shareholder rights—and urging shareholders to vote against the re-election of those directors.

·         On November 6, 2025, Biglari issued an open letter to shareholders reiterating his concerns.

·         On November 7, 2025, Egan-Jones has recommended that stockholders vote AGAINST the election of five incumbent nominees of the company at the upcoming annual meeting of shareholders, scheduled to be held on November 20, 2025. Source

·         On November 10, 2025 Biglari announced that proxy firms ISS, Glass Lewis and Egan-Jones recommend shareholders vote against certain Cracker Barrel directors and the board’s bylaw amendments, citing a failed rebrand, poor TSR and operational underperformance, weak governance. Glass Lewis opposed Gilbert Dávila for weak marketing oversight and Jody Bilney for supporting “arbitrary” bylaw changes, calling the revisions misaligned with governance standards. ISS also opposed Dávila, while Egan-Jones urged votes against CEO Julie Masino, Chairman Carl Berquist, and directors Dávila, Gisel Ruiz, and Darryl Wade, citing financial underperformance and the need for leadership change. 

Background: 

·         Biglari lost five proxy campaigns to elect directors in the FY 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2020

·         On November 5, 2021, Biglari Capital Corp (8.7%) issued a letter to shareholders expressing its concerns on the performance of the company that it has lagged behind both the peer median and the S&P MidCap 400 Index since the onset of Covid-19 and since the 2020 shareholder meeting held on November 19, 2020. Further, it urged that the Board should consider a more aggressive dividend payout policy.

·         On December 14, 2021, Biglari Capital Corp (8.7%) issued a letter to shareholders expressing its concerns on the performance of the company  It urged that the Board should consider a more aggressive dividend payout policy.

·         On June 6, 2022, Biglari Capital Corp (8.8%) issued a letter to shareholders reiterating its concerns.

·         On August 18, 2022, Biglari Capital Corp (8.8%) delivered a letter to the company nominating Jody L. Bilney and Kevin M. Reddy for election to the Board at the 2022 AGM. Source

·         On September 28, 2022, Biglari Capital Corp entered into an agreement with the company, leading to the expansion of the Board from ten to eleven members and the appointment of their nominee, Jody L. Bilney. Source

·         On August 16, 2024, Biglari Capital Corp (9%) nominated Milena Alberti-Perez, Julie Atkinson, Sardar Biglari, and Michael W. Goodwin for election to the Board at the 2024 annual meeting. On August 18, 2024, they submitted a supplemental nomination for Michelle Frymire, bringing the total number of nominees to five. Source

·         On September 23, 2024, Biglari Capital Corp (9.3%) filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees.

·         On September 23, 2024, Biglari Capital Corp withdrew their nomination of Julie Atkinson and Michelle Frymire as nominees for election at the Annual Meeting. With the withdrawal, Biglari Capital Corp intend to solicit proxies to elect the remaining Nominees to the Board at the Annual Meeting. Source

·         On October 1, 2024, Biglari Capital Corp filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees.

·         On October 8, 2024, Biglari Capital Corp. issued a letter to shareholders expressing concern over the company's declining market value, which has dropped over $2.9 billion since 2019. Despite ownership of 2,069,141 shares and attempts to highlight management failures, the Board's appointment of CEO Julie Felss Masino and her transformation plan have not restored confidence, leading to a 50.9% decrease in share price since her appointment. Biglari criticized the Board for its poor capital allocation decisions, including costly new stores and unsuccessful brand launches, which have resulted in significant losses. He emphasized the need for a Board overhaul and proposed focusing on core operations, halting new store openings, and improving existing store performance to regain customer traffic.

·         On October 24, 2024, Biglari released an investor presentation titled 'Cracker Barrel is in Crisis,' reiterating its concerns and seeking votes for its nominees.

·         On October 31, 2024, Biglari issued an additional Investor Presentation, "Setting the Record Straight" asserting that their nominees seek to collaborate rather than control, with no intention of executive roles.

·         On November 12, 2024, Biglari Capital Corp issued a press release announcing that Glass Lewis recommended that shareholders vote for two of Biglari capital's nominees and ISS recommends shareholders vote for one of Biglari capital's nominees

·         On November 13, 2024, Biglari Capital Corp, in a letter to the shareholders, highlighted a significant decline in the company's stock value, with a $100 investment in January 2019 now worth only $30. He argued that the current board, including Carl Berquist and Meg Crofton, was responsible for a 70% loss and had failed to turn the company around. He urged shareholders to vote for them, warning that without change, the company risked further losses.

·         At the AGM held on November 21, 2024, shareholders re-elected all the company's director nominees. Biglari's nominees were not elected to the Board.

Carronade Capital Nominates Four Directors and Proposes Changes to Boost Cannae Holdings (CNNE) Shareholder Value

 Key Summary: On March 20, 2025, Carronade Capital announced it would nominate four director candidates for Cannae’s 2025 Annual Meeting. Carronade criticized Cannae’s underperformance and governance, proposing cost reductions, better capital allocation, and stronger governance to boost shareholder returns by at least 50%. On September 4, 2025, Carronade resubmitted its nomination of directors to the Board.

 Market Cap: $1 billion | Cannae Holdings, Inc. is a principal investment firm. The firm primarily invests in restaurants, technology enabled healthcare services, financial services and more. 

·         On March 20, 2025, Carronade Capital Management announced it would nominate four director candidates for election at 2025 Annual Meeting. Carronade criticized Cannae's underperformance and poor governance practices, citing persistent capital allocation issues and misalignment between management and shareholders. The firm proposed reducing overhead costs, improving capital allocation, unlocking portfolio value, and instituting stronger governance to increase shareholder returns by at least 50%. Source

·         On April 7, 2025, Carronade issued a press release nominating four independent candidates for the Board. Carronade criticizes Cannae's recent actions as insufficient to address chronic underperformance, poor governance, and excessive executive payouts. The firm believes the current Board's behavior undermines shareholder value and that new independent directors are needed to unlock potential and address ongoing issues.

·         On June 10, 2025, Carronade Capital Management filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees.

·         On September 4, 2025, Carronade resubmitted its nomination of Mona Aboelnaga, Benjamin C. Duster IV, Dennis A. Prieto, and Cherie L. Schaible for election to the board at the December 12, 2025 annual meeting, after the Issuer delayed the meeting by more than 175 days past the prior year’s anniversary. Carronade had initially nominated the same slate on December 19, 2024, but was required to renominate under the company’s bylaws due to the delay. Source

·         On October 24, 2025, Carronade Capital Management filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees.

·         On November 10, 2025, Carronade Capital issued an investor presentation and press release urging change at the company.  Carronade criticized years of poor strategic decisions, weak oversight, and excessive insider compensation that led to chronic underperformance and a persistent valuation discount. It nominated four independent directors — Mona Aboelnaga, Benjamin Duster, Dennis Prieto, and Cherie Schaible — for election at the December 12, 2025 annual meeting, arguing their addition would restore accountability, improve governance, and unlock shareholder value.

Shah Capital issued a letter to the Board of  Novavax (NVAX)

 Key Summary: On May 6, 2024, Shah Capital Management, Inc. launched a campaign urging stockholders to vote against the re-election of all Novavax directors at the 2024 Annual Meeting. On May 20, 2024, Shah Capital withdrew its campaign. On October 13, 2025, Shah Capital Management, Inc sent a letter to the board urging them to undertake a formal strategic review, including an evaluation of a potential sale of the company.

 Market Cap: $1.4 billion | Novavax, Inc., a biotechnology company, that promotes improved health by discovering, developing, and commercializing vaccines to protect against serious infectious diseases.

·         On May 6, 2024, Shah Capital Management, Inc. launched a campaign urging stockholders to vote against the re-election of all Novavax directors at the 2024 Annual Meeting. They criticized the board and management for hindering the company's potential and advocated for fresh perspectives to restore investor confidence. Shah Capital filed a proxy statement to solicit votes against three Class II Directors and three other proposals, emphasizing the need for urgent change due to poor performance and unresponsiveness. Source

·         On May 20, 2024, Shah Capital Management, Inc (7.9%) announced that in light of recent developments at the company, they have determined to withdraw their preliminary proxy statement and campaign against the re-election of the Class II directors at the upcoming annual meeting. Source

·         On October 13, 2025, Shah Capital Management, Inc sent a letter to the board urging them to undertake a formal strategic review, including an evaluation of a potential sale of the company. The letter expressed Shah Capital’s concerns regarding the company’s significant share-price underperformance, operational and marketing failures, and recent capital-allocation decisions. Shah Capital stated their belief that immediate action is needed to restore investor confidence and realize the full value of the company's assets and technology for shareholders.

·         On November 12, 2025, Shah Capital Management, Inc (8.2%) sent a letter to the board criticizing the board for weak leadership, collapsing Nuvaxovid uptake (~120K doses vs. 14.5M for rivals), poor marketing, lack of proactive scientific benchmarking, excessive SG&A/R&D costs, misleading dilution claims, and repeated operational missteps. While still believing in the vaccine science, Shah argues Novavax’s execution has squandered its advantages and insists that shareholder value would be best served by exploring a sale to a larger, more capable pharma, urging the board to form a committee and hire an investment banker.